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the Case for the tax Collector
Marie t. reilly
i. introduction
Real property tax is always controversial. It is regressive and based 
on dubious assessments of value.1 Proponents and detractors typically 
debate tax rates, rebates, exemptions, and assessment.2 In contrast, dis-
cussion of the technicalities of tax collection—the means by which state 
and local governments turn tax liability into cash revenue—is usually 
left to tax collectors and other sinners.3 In bad economic times, how-
ever, tax enforcement becomes front page news.4 People become unable 
or unwilling to pay real property taxes as their income and property val-
ues fall. The tax collector responds to their defaults with foreclosures.5
The case for relief from the press of tax and mortgage debt for de-
linquent property owners faced with loss of a home is easy to make. 
Bankruptcy law provides an important source of this relief.6 This article 
makes the more difficult case for the rights of the property tax collector. 
Abandoned properties turn neighborhoods into wastelands.7 As the tax 
base shrinks, revenues drop, and costs rise, the tax enforcement process 
becomes critical to the survival of state and local governments and the 
communities they serve. In bad economic times, the tax collector more 
than ever needs a mechanism to seize property in satisfaction of tax 
debt swiftly and with finality.8
Real property tax enforcement process varies among jurisdictions.9 
Some features are common. Upon the tax debtor’s default, the tax credi-
tor acquires a lien on the subject property, typically senior to all other 
liens or interests.10 In most jurisdictions, the tax creditor either sells the 
property at a public auction11 or assigns its secured collection right to 
a third party via a public or private auction customarily known as a tax 
lien sale.12 After expiration of the debtor’s time to redeem legal title to 
the property by paying the tax plus interest, the third party forecloses 
the debtor’s equity of redemption and takes title to the property free of 
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all interests junior to the tax lien. In a few jurisdictions, the tax creditor 
can enforce the lien and obtain a deed to the property without auction 
or sale and without regard to the value of the property.13
If the property is worth more than the tax debt, the difference is the 
debtor’s loss and the tax collector’s gain. A bidder at a tax lien sale will 
take the prospect of the debtor’s redemption into account in bidding for 
the tax collector’s rights. To the extent that the right to the property is 
subject to post hoc reversal or avoidance, bidders will pay less and the 
tax collector will collect less on account of its foreclosure rights. Soft-
ening the process to provide relief to debtors comes at the expense of 
the tax collector and his constituents—state and local governments and 
the citizens they serve.
If the debtor files for bankruptcy shortly after a wealth-depleting tax 
foreclosure, the debtor’s creditors become interested in reversing the 
transfer and recovering the lost wealth for the estate. The trustee can 
characterize the transfer as a constructive fraud, made while the debtor 
was insolvent, and for “less than a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change.”14 If the trustee’s argument is successful, the estate recovers 
the property. The tax creditor retains a lien against the property for the 
amount of the tax debt. However, the tax creditor loses to the estate the 
difference between the value of the property and the tax debt. 
The application of the trustee’s constructive fraud avoiding power to 
tax lien foreclosures pits federal bankruptcy law against state tax law. 
Federal bankruptcy law treats tax foreclosure as a “transfer” of the debt-
or’s property.15 It grants a bankruptcy trustee power to avoid the foreclo-
sure and recapture lost wealth for the estate if, among other things, the 
transfer is “for less than “reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”16 If 
the hypothetical fair market value of the property is greater than the tax 
debt, then transfer of the property to the tax collector appears to be “for 
less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange.” From the tax col-
lector’s perspective, however, assessment of the reasonableness of the 
foreclosure transfer by reference to the fair market value of the property 
makes no sense given the regulated conditions under which the foreclo-
sure transfer actually occurs.
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,17 the U.S. Supreme Court con-
sidered and resolved the conflict between federal and state law in the 
context of a mortgage foreclosure sale. It held that the price a bidder 
pays at a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale is a “rea-
sonably equivalent value in exchange” for the property.18 The transfer to 
the winning bidder at the foreclosure sale is not avoidable under federal 
fraudulent transfer law even if the bid is less than the hypothetical fair 
market value of the property. In a footnote, the Court expressly limited 
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its opinion to “mortgage foreclosures of real property.”19 “The consid-
erations bearing upon other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax 
liens, for example) may be different.”20
This article considers the question the Court reserved in this footnote. 
Is a transfer of property via a noncollusive, properly conducted prop-
erty tax foreclosure process entitled to respect in bankruptcy against 
the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power? It answers this ques-
tion in the affirmative. Part II examines the Court’s opinion in BFP 
and how courts have applied it in fraudulent transfer challenges to tax 
foreclosure transfers. Most courts have read BFP as requiring a com-
parison between the conditions under which the tax foreclosure at issue 
occurs and mortgage foreclosure. If the tax foreclosure process does 
not require public sale with competitive bidding, then BFP does not 
apply and the tax foreclosure transfer is not necessarily for “reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange.” Part III criticizes this trend and makes 
the argument in defense of the tax collector. A foreclosure sale yields 
reasonably equivalent value because it complies with applicable non-
bankruptcy law. Thus differences among the states in procedural attri-
butes of tax or mortgage foreclosure transfers are not legally significant. 
As the footnote in BFP suggests, tax foreclosure is different than mort-
gage foreclosure in one legally significant respect, and the difference is 
in favor of the tax collector. A challenge to the “reasonableness” of a 
transfer under state tax foreclosure law is a challenge to the legality of 
the tax. Bankruptcy Code § 505 narrowly circumscribes the bankruptcy 
court’s power to determine “the amount or legality of any tax.” It may 
not substitute its judgment for that of the state legislature as to the valid-
ity and finality of tax foreclosure.
ii. tax Foreclosure and “reasonably Equivalent Value” Under 
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
A partnership named BFP acquired a house in Newport Beach, Cali-
fornia subject to a mortgage in favor of Imperial Savings Association.21 
BFP defaulted, and Imperial properly noticed a foreclosure sale of the 
property. A third party purchased the property for $433,000, 59% of the 
property’s estimated fair market value.22 Three months later, BFP filed 
for relief under Chapter 11. As debtor in possession, it sought to avoid 
the transfer as a constructive fraud under § 548.
Section 548(a)(1) gives the trustee power to avoid certain prepeti-
tion transfers of the debtor’s property that occur within the two years 
before the filing of a petition while the debtor is insolvent or which ren-
der him insolvent.23 In particular, § 548(a)(1)(B) permits the trustee to 
avoid transfers if an insolvent debtor “voluntarily or involuntarily—(i) 
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received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation.”24 Although the Bankruptcy Code defines “value” 
for purposes of § 548, it does not define “reasonably equivalent value.”25
The bankruptcy court dismissed the fraudulent transfer action, hold-
ing that the sale was conducted without collusion or fraud and in com-
pliance with California law. Thus the transfer price achieved was a 
“reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”26 The district court and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.27
Justice Scalia, writing for a five-to-four majority, identified the issue 
as whether the debtor received “less than reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange” for the interest in real property that it lost at the foreclosure 
sale.28 The transfer gave the winning bidder title to the property free 
of the debtor’s equity of redemption in exchange for the foreclosure 
sale price. The debtor in possession contended that the price was not a 
“reasonably equivalent value in exchange” for the property because the 
winning bid of $433,000 was not reasonably equivalent to $725,000, 
the hypothetical fair market value of the property at the time of the sale.
The Court considered lower court opinions that used the fair market 
value of the transferred property as the benchmark against which to 
measure the “reasonable equivalence” of the foreclosure sale price.29 
It also considered Matter of Bundles30 where the Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized a presumption that the price achieved at a properly conducted 
foreclosure sale is a reasonably equivalent value, subject to rebuttal 
based on evidence of the unreasonableness of a particular foreclosure.31 
The Court rejected both approaches. It concluded that both improperly 
referred to the estimated fair market value of the transferred property 
as the measure of its worth for purposes of determining the “reasonable 
equivalence” of the foreclosure sale price.32
The Court explained that comparison between hypothetical fair mar-
ket value and the forced transfer price ignores: 1) the impact of mar-
ket conditions on value; and 2) the traditional prerogative of states to 
regulate creditors’ debt enforcement rights against property. On the first 
point, as a matter of statutory interpretation, because Congress could 
have used “fair market value” but chose “reasonably equivalent value” 
instead, “[o]ne must suspect the language means that fair market value 
cannot—or at least cannot always—be the benchmark.”33 When the 
transfer occurs as part of a creditor-forced sale, the “fair” market value 
referent is not a relevant point of comparison. “‘[F]air market value’ 
presumes market conditions that, by definition, simply do not obtain in 
the context of a forced sale.”34 Property subject to foreclosure is worth 
less than the same property valued under “fair market” conditions.35
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On the second point, the Court recognized that the phrase “reason-
ably equivalent value” could be interpreted to require comparison of the 
foreclosure sale price with a “reasonable” or “fair” forced sale price.36 
However, it rejected this interpretation. The required determination—
whether a state-regulated foreclosure process is sufficiently “reason-
able” as to yield a price that is the “reasonable equivalent” of the value 
of the property—would be a federal encroachment on state authority to 
regulate title to property that section 548 does not authorize.37
The Court related the first point to the second: the difference between 
a forced sale price of property and its fair market value depends on the 
terms of the forced sale, and the timing and manner in which the fore-
closure occurs is a matter for states to decide. The Court observed that 
mortgage foreclosure processes are not standard but vary among the 
states “depending upon, among other things, how the particular State 
values the divergent interests of debtor and creditor.”38 It summarized 
typical features such as notice to the defaulting debtor, opportunity for 
the debtor or another party in interest to redeem the property by pay-
ing the debt, and bidding rules and auction procedures.39 State law also 
governs the finality of foreclosure. Once the process is complete under 
state law, inadequacy of the foreclosure price is not grounds to set aside 
the transfer, although some states recognize that a price so low as to 
“shock the conscience” raises a rebuttable presumption of collusion or 
actual fraudulent intent.40
The Court concluded that Congress could have intended that § 548 
“disrupt the ancient harmony”41 between fraudulent conveyance law 
and state foreclosure law.42 However, the phrase “for less than reason-
ably equivalent value in exchange” is insufficient textual guidance to 
justify “such a radical departure.”43
The ominous footnote that “considerations bearing upon other fore-
closures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be dif-
ferent)” 44 offered no clue as to what aspects of tax foreclosures might 
be different, or how such a difference might affect the balance between 
federal and state authority. The footnote opened the way for bankruptcy 
courts to evaluate the “reasonableness” of foreclosure transfers whenever 
the transfer can be distinguished from the mortgage foreclosure in BFP.45
iii. tax Foreclosure transfers and reasonably Equivalent Value
After BFP, courts have struggled to determine its scope.46 A few 
courts have held that, despite the footnote, tax foreclosures are not dif-
ferent than mortgage foreclosures. Both yield reasonably equivalent 
value.47 Most courts have taken a narrower view of the scope of BFP. 
For these courts, the key to the holding is similarity between the condi-
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tions under which the transfer occurs and those that define a free market 
transaction, e.g., public notice, competitive bidding and other circum-
stances that tend to raise the transfer price toward fair market value.48 
So, for example, if the transfer occurred by a process that exposed the 
property to competitive bidding at an advertised public sale, the price 
achieved through such a process is a “reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change” for the property, even if the price is far less than the hypotheti-
cal fair market value of the property. On the other hand, if the process 
does not expose the property to competitive bidding, the transfer is not 
necessarily “for reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”49
For example, in Murphy,50 the debtor failed to pay property tax to 
the Town of Harrison during the three years that she held title, totaling 
about $30,000.51 New York allows a tax creditor “strict foreclosure” of 
property subject to a tax lien. At a fixed time after default, if the tax-
payer has not paid the debt, title to the property is transferred to the 
tax creditor in exchange for extinguishment of the debt.52 The Town 
initiated an in rem proceeding to collect the unpaid property tax under 
New York law.53 After the redemption period expired, the Receiver of 
Taxes and Enforcement Officer for the Town conveyed the property to 
the Town, and the Town cancelled the debtor’s tax liability.
Six months later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief. The Chapter 7 
trustee challenged the transfer as an avoidable constructive fraud under 
§ 548.54 The Town argued that under BFP the strict foreclosure of the 
debtor’s property was for “reasonably equivalent value in exchange” 
and not subject to fraudulent transfer avoidance.55 The trustee respond-
ed that BFP did not apply. It argued that the Court limited the holding 
in BFP to real property mortgage foreclosures by sale with competitive 
bidding. Because the strict foreclosure occurred without competitive 
bidding, indeed without sale of any kind, BFP did not apply, and the 
transfer was subject to avoidance under § 548 in the debtor’s subsequent 
bankruptcy case. It noted that, “[u]nlike in a mortgage foreclosure under 
New York law, where the market is redefined, the market is completely 
destroyed by New York tax forfeiture proceedings.”56
Most courts considering a tax foreclosure after BFP have followed 
this approach.57 The key for courts adopting this view is whether the 
state-regulated foreclosure process is reasonable and, in particular, 
whether it exposes the property to competitive bidding. In Murphy, the 
court held that New York’s tax foreclosure process whereby the tax col-
lector receives a deed to the property upon expiration of the debtor’s 
redemption period simply does not yield a “price” that necessarily re-
flects the “value” of the property for purposes of “reasonably equivalent 
value” under § 548.
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Although this argument has proven appealing, the Court in BFP 
squarely rejected it. The important aspect of a foreclosure transfer is not 
how the state regulates it, but rather that the state regulates it. The fact 
that a transfer occurs pursuant to a properly conducted, state-regulated 
foreclosure process fully accounts for the difference between the val-
ue that the debtor receives (debt forgiveness) and the hypothetical fair 
market value of the property. The difference is reasonable for fraudu-
lent transfer purposes under bankruptcy law because the state-regulated 
foreclosure process is entitled to respect in bankruptcy without regard 
to whether the state regulated processes themselves are reasonably cal-
culated to return the highest possible value to the debtor.
The Court in BFP compared state foreclosure law with zoning law: both 
affect the “value” of the property, and neither can be ignored by a bank-
ruptcy court determining the property’s “value.” It held: “Absent a clear 
statutory requirement to the contrary, we must assume the validity of this 
state-law regulatory background and take due account of its effect.”58
iV. tax Claims are different
As the ominous footnote in BFP suggests, tax lien foreclosures are 
different from mortgage foreclosures. However, the difference has noth-
ing to do with competitive bidding. The difference arises because of the 
nature of the tax collector’s right and the treatment of tax liability under 
the Bankruptcy Code.
State and local governments use the tax foreclosure process to ex-
ecute sovereign power to levy and collect tax on real property.59 To 
strike an appropriate balance between state and federal power, the Tax 
Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits a federal court from hearing a challenge 
to a tax claim under state law whenever “a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such a state.”60 The purpose of the 
TIA is to preserve the fundamental balance between national and state 
governmental power with respect to taxation..61
The Bankruptcy Code provides a narrow exception to the TIA. Under 
§ 505(a)(1), a bankruptcy court may determine the “amount or legality 
of any tax” except in circumstances specified in subsection (a)(2). The 
pertinent limitations are expressed in subsections (a)(2)(A) and (C).
Subsection (a)(2)(A) incorporates res judicata (claim preclusion) as a 
limit on the bankruptcy court’s power to determine tax liability.62 It bars 
the bankruptcy court from determining the amount or legality of a tax if 
it “was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.”63 Congress added subsection (a)(2)
(C) as part of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act.64 It bars a bankruptcy 
court from considering the amount or legality of an ad valorem tax on 
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real or personal property of the estate, “if the applicable period for con-
testing or redetermining that amount under any law (other than a bank-
ruptcy law) has expired.”65 Thus subsection (a)(2)(C) overrules prior 
cases that interpreted § 505(a) to allow a bankruptcy court to determine 
tax claims even after the time for disputing the claim had expired under 
nonbankruptcy law.66
Congress offered no express guidance as to how to reconcile the 
prohibition on interference in matters of state taxation made clear in 
§ 505(a)(2)(A) and (C) with the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding 
power under § 548(a)(1)(B). A challenge to a state tax foreclosure trans-
fer on fraudulent transfer grounds under § 548 is an act to “enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax” barred 
under the TIA. And it is a challenge to the “amount or legality of a tax” 
under § 505. As such, it is subject to the TIA and also to the limited ex-
ceptions to the injunction provided in § 505(a). Once the debtor’s equity 
of redemption is extinguished under state law, under § 505(A)(2)(c), the 
bankruptcy court may not exercise jurisdiction because “the applicable 
period for contesting or redetermining [the tax] under [nonbankruptcy 
law] has expired.” If the foreclosure transfer is not final at the time that 
the bankruptcy case is filed, a bankruptcy court determining the amount 
or legality of tax under § 505 must apply nonbankruptcy tax law.67 The 
bankruptcy court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the state or 
local government regarding the amount or legality of the debtor’s taxes.
Although no court to date has considered squarely whether a § 548 
challenge to a tax foreclosure transfer is an act to “enjoin, suspend or 
restrain” the levy of a tax subject to the TIA and § 505, the court in In re 
Northbrook Partners LLP held that the debtor’s challenge to real prop-
erty taxes on grounds that they were larger than they should be under 
proper assessment is a challenge to the amount or legality of taxes under 
§ 505(a).68 An action to avoid a tax foreclosure transfer on grounds that 
it was for “less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange” is analo-
gous. In both situations, the payment on account of taxes is, in the view 
of the challenger, larger than the law allows.
The counterargument is that a fraudulent transfer challenge to a tax 
foreclosure transfer is not an act to restrain the levy of a tax or a deter-
mination of the amount or legality of a tax and does not trigger the TIA 
or § 505. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the legal distinc-
tion between a challenge to a tax foreclosure transfer and a challenge to 
the amount or legality of a tax quickly collapses upon considering the 
common purpose of §§ 548 and 505. Both recognize a limited power 
for a bankruptcy court to redefine state law property rights. They also 
share a common bankruptcy purpose—to protect the debtor, and deriva-
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tively his creditors, from dissipation of the estate’s assets caused by the 
debtor’s failure to protect his own interests (by contesting a tax bill or 
resisting a wealth-depleting exchange) during his slide into insolvency 
before filing for bankruptcy relief.69 Section 548 applies to a wide va-
riety of wealth-depleting events, whereas § 505 applies to tax liability. 
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the specific treatment of chal-
lenges to tax claims in § 505 should prevail over the general in § 548.70
A second possible counterargument rests on the effect of avoidance 
of a tax foreclosure. Arguably, avoidance of a tax foreclosure transfer 
under § 548 does not trigger the TIA because after avoidance, the tax 
debt will remain secured by a first lien on the property.71 Thus avoidance 
of a tax foreclosure transfer is not a challenge to the amount or legal-
ity of taxes. Rather, the sole function of a § 548 challenge is to recover 
for the estate the surplus of value over tax debt lost by a constructively 
fraudulent transfer, and thus section 505 does not apply.
The court in Murphy did not consider the possible application of the 
TIA or section 505, but it did note the distinction between a tax creditor 
who retains a priming lien on the property for tax debt after fraudulent 
transfer avoidance and other creditors whose interests may be avoided 
under section 548.72 The case presented an unusual situation. The mar-
ket value of the property transferred to the town under New York strict 
foreclosure law was sufficient to pay all creditor claims against the es-
tate with some left over. The court held that the transfer was avoidable 
but only to the extent necessary to pay the claims of creditors.73 The 
town was entitled to the balance, which was more than sufficient to 
cover the debtor’s taxes. The debtor recovered nothing. The court noted 
that its holding “impinged on a state regulatory scheme” but “only to 
the extent that the scheme conflicts with the clear dictates of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.”74
The argument that section 548 does not affect state sovereignty over 
taxation because only the value of property in excess of the tax debt is 
at stake ignores the economic reality of property tax collection. The tax 
collector’s right to the surplus value is an integral part of the tax col-
lection process and, indeed, an integral part of real property tax.75 Even 
though fraudulent transfer avoidance leaves intact the tax creditor’s lien 
in the property to the extent of the tax debt,76 the prospect of loss of the 
surplus upon fraudulent transfer avoidance is not inconsequential to the 
state’s interest in collecting taxes.
The tax creditor’s ability to foreclose the debtor’s property interest 
in the surplus creates a powerful incentive for the debtor to pay the tax. 
At the end of the foreclosure process, the tax creditor or its assignee is 
entitled to a deed to the property free of interests junior to the tax lien 
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(such as a mortgage). Thus the right to obtain the surplus by foreclosure 
creates an incentive for mortgagees to monitor the debtor and pay the 
tax if he does not.77 In bad times especially, when property values fall 
and people owe more on their property than it is worth, the tax credi-
tor’s right to foreclose the interests of mortgagees and other junior lien 
creditors is an important tool to ensure that someone remains interested 
in paying the tax.
Moreover, if the right to the surplus is subject to a bankruptcy-creat-
ed cloud, the price that foreclosure sale bidders are willing to pay for the 
tax collector’s rights declines.78 Bidders at tax foreclosure sales subject 
to the debtor’s equity of redemption take into account the risk associ-
ated with the prospect that the debtor will redeem by paying the tax 
before the expiration of the statutory redemption period. If this period 
is subject to extension in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the value 
of the property at auction declines further.
The tax collector’s case for the surplus remains troubling for those 
who view the tax collector’s victory as a windfall at the expense of the 
debtor. In the debtor’s bankruptcy, the debtor’s loss falls on helpless 
creditors. Their right to justice comes from federal bankruptcy power to 
avoid such a transfer under § 548.
Justice for debtors and their creditors against the tax collector is in 
the eye of the beholder. State and local governments view the “fairness” 
of their tax foreclosure laws differently than bankruptcy courts who are 
primarily concerned with creditors of the estate. Tax foreclosure laws 
reflect the history of economic expansion and real property develop-
ment in the U.S. Throughout the 19th century, enforcement of the tax 
collector’s rights against the tax debtor in personam required personal 
service on the debtor within the territorial limits of the state.79 A tax 
debtor who had left the jurisdiction left his in personam liability behind. 
Tax collectors relied on enforcement of in rem rights against the prop-
erty to satisfy tax debt and to resolve issues of title to property subject 
to taxation.80
At the beginning of the 20th century, expedited in rem proceed-
ings against the debtor’s property to satisfy tax debt were the norm. 
The debtor and his creditors were entitled to notice of the tax foreclo-
sure process, typically by publication not personal service.81 Model tax 
foreclosure legislation at the mid-20th century emphasized swift, final, 
low-cost tax foreclosure, with minimal emphasis on time-consuming, 
expensive notice or other procedures that might increase the foreclosure 
sale price of the property for the benefit of the debtor or third parties 
with interests in it.82
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By the mid-20th century, federal due process jurisprudence took a 
different view of the swift and low-cost in rem tax foreclosure process 
and its effect on the nonvigilant debtor and his creditors. In Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,83 the Court invalidated any distinc-
tion in the type of notice required in rem and in personam proceedings. 
For jurisdiction over any dispute, interested parties are entitled to “no-
tice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise [them] 
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”84
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams85 
considered a mortgagee’s constitutional due process challenge to fore-
closure of its interest in property by a property tax foreclosure. Under 
Indiana law, the owner was entitled to notice of the sale by certified 
mail, but mortgagees were entitled to notice by publication only.86 By 
the time that the mortgagee learned of the tax sale, the redemption pe-
riod had run, and the purchaser had applied for a deed to the property 
and initiated an action to quiet title.87 The mortgagee argued that it had 
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale or the op-
portunity to redeem the property following the sale.88
The Court held that the 14th Amendment guaranty of due process re-
quires that a government conducting a tax foreclosure sale must provide 
notice to a mortgagee “reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending 
tax sale.”89 If the mortgagee is identifiable in a publicly recorded mortgage, 
constructive notice by publication is not sufficient. The tax collector must 
also provide notice by mail to the mortgagee’s last known address.90
The dissent in Mennonite took up the case of the tax collector. It rea-
soned that the majority improperly ignored the ability of the mortgagee 
to look after its own interests.91 A mortgagee knows that property tax on 
the mortgaged property will be assessed on regular intervals and, armed 
with this knowledge, could protect its interests. “The historical justifi-
cation for constructive notice was that those with an interest in prop-
erty were under an obligation to act reasonably in keeping themselves 
informed of proceedings that affected that property.”92 Foreshadowing 
the majority opinion in In re BFP, the dissent noted that the state’s in-
terest in collection of tax revenue is vital and federal intrusion should 
be kept to the barest minimum.93 In response to the majority’s sugges-
tion that mailing foreclosure notices to record owners and lien holders 
rather than publication might better serve the tax collector, the dissent 
retorted: “The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge of 
how it wants to settle its tax debts than this Court.”94
After Mennonite, many states modified or completely overhauled 
real property tax foreclosure procedures.95 The circuits split on the level 
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of diligence in notifying parties with an interest in the property that the 
constitution requires. In Jones v. Flowers,96 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the due process clause requires a government to take 
additional steps to notify a tax debtor when a notice of tax sale sent by 
certified mail is returned undelivered.97 Justice Roberts for the majority 
held that while the tax debtor should have been more diligent regard-
ing his property, the government must do more than simply “shrug [its] 
shoulders” and say “I tried” after the notice of tax foreclosure came 
back unclaimed.98 The Court held that the state should have taken “ad-
ditional reasonable steps” to notify the taxpayer of the sale and that its 
failure to take those steps was an unconstitutional deprivation of prop-
erty without due process.99 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy, dissented. An attempt to notify a tax debtor of impend-
ing foreclosure by certified mail at his address of record satisfies due 
process. “Due process requires nothing more—and certainly not here, 
where petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to report any 
change of address to the state taxing authority.”100
Due process challenges to tax foreclosure proceedings offer a prom-
ising strategy to address the equitable concern for the debtor and his 
creditors. Consider In re Pontes, decided before the Court’s opinion in 
Jones, in which a delinquent tax debtor successfully argued in a Chapter 
13 case that the Rhode Island tax foreclosure process was constitution-
ally defective.101 The City of Providence sold the debtor’s residence at a 
tax sale to recover delinquent property tax. The debtor received by mail 
a tax sale notice alerting him to the right to avoid the sale by paying the 
tax. The debtor did not pay, the sale was held, and a third party bought 
the property for the tax debt. At the end of the one-year statutory re-
demption period, the purchaser filed a petition to foreclose the tax lien 
and served it on the debtor. The debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13 
and brought an adversary proceeding against the City to recover title to 
the property.102 Although the market value of the house exceeded the 
tax debt, the debtor did not seek to avoid the transfer as a constructive 
fraud under § 548. Instead, he argued that the tax sale occurred without 
sufficient notice to him of his right to redeem the property in violation 
of his constitutional right to due process.103
The bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction under § 505(a) to 
consider the legality of the debtor’s taxes and specifically to determine 
whether the Rhode Island tax sale process provided the debtor with 
constitutionally required due process regarding notice of his right to 
redeem property after a tax sale.104 It held that the tax foreclosure statute 
“create[d] an unreasonable risk of erroneous deprivation of a significant 
property interest” and was constitutionally defective.105 Although the 
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debtor knew that he had not paid the property tax and that his home was 
to be sold, the fact that he did not receive notice of his right to redeem 
the property following the sale was an unconstitutional deprivation of 
due process.
V. Conclusion
Although the particular issue considered in this article is narrow, the 
issue is part of a larger controversy. The case for the tax collector’s right 
to the surplus against a fraudulent transfer challenge is difficult to make 
because tax foreclosure and fraudulent transfer law differ on the appro-
priate standard of fairness to creditors. Fraudulent transfer law elevates 
the fair market transfer as the archetype of fairness. The tax foreclosure 
process departs from this norm because a process designed to achieve 
the highest possible value in exchange for tax delinquent property is a 
luxury that state and local governments cannot afford. State and local 
governments need a foreclosure process that creates a strong incentive 
for the debtor and mortgagees to pay property tax even as property val-
ues decline. They need a swift way to pass clear and final title to tax 
delinquent and abandoned property to purchasers who will occupy the 
property and stem the tide of urban blight. From the tax collector’s per-
spective, a tax foreclosure process that achieves these goals is fair to 
taxpayers who pay their taxes and those who do not.
This article considers who decides which perspective on fairness 
governs the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power in a bankruptcy 
case. Even after BFP, courts continue to cling to the view that the Court 
rejected in that case — that the foreclosure process yields “a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange” only if it provides for transfer by compet-
itive bidding and market-like conditions. In BFP, the Court rejected the 
fair market transfer as the relevant archetype. It held that state and local 
foreclosure transfers yield reasonably equivalent value because control 
of the foreclosure process is the province of state law, which Congress 
has not clearly preempted. Moreover, as of 2005, section 505(a)(2)(C) 
expressly preempts bankruptcy court interference in state tax foreclo-
sure transfers.
The tax collector can state with confidence that competitive bidding 
and market-like conditions of a tax foreclosure transfer do not matter. 
Due process, not fraudulent transfer law, supplies the relevant safeguard 
for debtors and their creditors in bankruptcy.
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